There will be a series of blog posts examining the recent decision published by Nominet Experts in DRS 28377. This first post sets out the background to the matter.
I would welcome input from other DRS Experts, as well as those more broadly involved in the domain name dispute community. To support that discussion, I will be publishing the submissions I made throughout the DRS process from start to finish. The only exception will be certain email correspondence with Bona Vacantia and GoDaddy, as these involved third parties and it would not be appropriate to make them public without consent.
For transparency, I was the individual behind the Complaint submitted on behalf of Quick Loans Ltd. When I refer to “the Complainant”, I am referring to my own actions and decisions in that capacity.
I may occasionally use “I”, “we”, or “the Complainant” interchangeably, but I take full responsibility for everything that was submitted.
This opening post is unlikely to be of interest to most readers. However, it is necessary to establish the foundation - without it, the later analysis will lack proper context. One of the issues with the current public narrative around this case is precisely that: a lack of context.
Before assessing the outcome - particularly the finding of Reverse Domain Name Hijacking (RDNH) - it is important to understand what I knew at each stage.
When I submitted the DRS, I did not know the identity of the underlying registrant. The WHOIS data was initially blank, later showed GoDaddy Privacy, and only subsequently identified CashEuroNet UK, LLC.
The Complaint was therefore structured in the standard way used where the registrant is unknown:
Unlike the first DRS in 2023, no evidence of confusion was included in this Complaint. That is because no such evidence existed in relation to the .uk domain at the time.
In the 2023 proceedings, there was significant evidence of confusion between QuickLoans.co.uk and QuickQuid.co.uk, which arose in a different factual context. This case concerned a separate domain (quickquid.uk), with an unknown registrant and no identifiable interaction with the Complainant’s business.
The evidence relied upon in this Complaint was therefore different. It was not based on demonstrated instances of confusion, but on the similarity of the names and the foreseeable risk of confusion in a regulated financial-services context.
My position was straightforward. My company held rights in a distinctive name, “QuickQuid”. I could not identify any legitimate reason for a third party to still be holding the matching .uk domain. In the absence of any response or explanation, the relevant provisions of the Policy (including paragraphs 5.1.1.2 and 5.1.1.3, albeit misnumbered in the original Complaint as 5.1.2 and 5.1.3 respectively. The numbering was wrong, the pleading in words was correct) were intended to apply.
At the time, the identity of the registrant was unknown. There were a number of plausible possibilities, including the respondent being the former administrators Grant Thornton (They still hold the Facebook Group for QQ and won't release it), a trade mark agent, a web developer, or another third party connected to the historical operation of the QuickQuid brand. It was also possible that the registrant remained CashEuroNet UK LLC and therefore I believed at the time submission - Bona Vacantia Department.
In the absence of clear registrant information, the Complaint was framed on the basis of those uncertainties.
If a Respondent had come forward with a credible and legitimate explanation for holding the domain, I would have had the option to withdraw the Complaint at that stage.
That was the framework within which the Complaint was brought.
The Complaint advanced the following key points:
The first Expert found that:
Here I pointed out the issues with the First Expert's Conclusions:
There were three substantial parts to the DRS Non-Standard Submission, which were filed before the three-member Appeal Panel was appointed.
Points made by the 3 Expert Appeal Panel:
Not everyone will read this page in full, but for those who want to familiarise themselves with the matter, it provides a solid foundation to start from. As we go into the next 2 parts of this story, it will begin to make sense.
There are only two pieces of material that have not been included here - the emails to GoDaddy and the emails to Bona Vacantia. The Bona Vacantia correspondence relates to me providing evidence of the Delaware cancellation and making enquiries about the potential purchase of any assets. If Nominet/Experts want to share them, they can.
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